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    In the following paper I will attempt to construe an account of moral progress that goes beyond our intuitive idea of non-moral progress hastily applied ad-hoc to moral concepts and problems. I first attempt this by applying a non-moral... more
    In the following paper I will attempt to construe an account of moral progress that goes beyond our intuitive idea of non-moral progress hastily applied ad-hoc to moral concepts and problems. I first attempt this by applying a non-moral theory of progress (F.A. Hayek’s theory of progress as tool-use) to consequentialist (Peter Singer’s utilitarianism) and deontological (Immanuel Kant’s deontology) ideas of morality and finding that this non-moral theory is inadequate in representing moral progress. This brings me back to the original problem of lacking anything but an intuitive account of moral progress. I then move to construct two accounts of progress specifically tailored to account for morality by formulating two separate theories of what constitutes moral progress, one stemming from a deontological account of morality and one from a consequentialist account of morality. I further outline and characterize these theories by taking up criticisms specifically targeted against them as well as those against their “parent” moralities that impact them. I then perform a comparative analysis of the two theories, showing their strengths and weaknesses when placed opposite of each other. After this comparison I end up with two full accounts of moral progress, one deontological and one consequentialist, showing that it is possible to give an account of moral progress within the framework of established theories of ethics.

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