Ladakh: independence is not enough more

DRAFT: please cite the published version: van Beek, M. and K. B. Bertelsen (1995). Ladakh: 'Independence' Is Not Enough. Himal. 8: 7-15. Ladakh: Independence is not enough Martijn van Beek Kristoffer Brix Bertelsen Within the near future, Leh District in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir will be governed by an Autonomous Hill District Council. At the time of writing, the bill is lying with the Prime Minister's office in Delhi, and could be signed into law by the President of India in the next few weeks. [see box for the recent state of affairs] The granting of the Hill Council signifies the fulfillment of a longstanding demand of Ladakh's population, and will give far-reaching powers to local politicians in the administration of the district. The framework for the council was drafted after the model of the Gorkhaland Council in Darjeeling, the first of this kind of institution, which has become a popular instrument in the reorganisation of Centre-State-Community relations in India. Similar institutions have been created, or are under discussion, for Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and parts of the Northeast. Indeed, some have suggested that the Hill council formula could be used to find a satisfactory solution to the persistent 'Kashmir Issue'. Although demands for greater local autonomy have become a prominent feature of Indian (and indeed global) politics in recent years, most of these struggles have much older antecedents. Here, we will look more closely at the history of Ladakh's struggle for 'freedom' from Kashmir. In particular, we will examine the communalisation of politics in Ladakh, and the potential as well as the dangers that come with the institution of the Hill Council for regional 'communal' peace. In brief, the Hill Council formula replicates a logic of fragmentation along regional and/or communal lines that has fostered the communalisation of politics in India. Given its present popularity as a formula for the resolution of regional/ethnic imbalances and conflicts, it is necessary to ask whether this formula, based on an imagining of regions and communities as homogeneous, unambiguously bounded, and stable, does indeed deliver what it promises: a fuller, more just participation of 'the people' in local decision making. And, relatedly, we'll critically examine whether in this formula a solution can be found to the problem of communalism. Ancient Futures Revisited: Communities and Communalism in Ladakh Ladakh, as so many other Himalayan regions, has suffered from the Lost Horizons syndrome of journalists, academics, and politicians. Indeed, the region has been caught between the Scilla and Charybdis of 'Shangri-la' and 'backward tribals' labeling. On the one hand, there are the numerous descriptions of its peaceful, cheerful, and ecologically sound society and economy. On the other hand, administrators in particular have emphasized its backwardness in economic terms. While it would go too far to ascribe to these imaginings the primary cause for contemporary political conflict, they have profoundly affected not only the administrative policies towards the area, but also Ladakhi perceptions of themselves. The central complaint voiced by Ladakh's political leadership since the 1930s is that the region has not received its fair share of resources allocated by the State Government in particular. While it is important to note that this sense of discrimination is shared throughout the region, grievances and demands have mainly been voiced by the Buddhist leadership; all-Ladakh issues have increasingly been contested along 'communal' lines. The communalisation of Ladakhi politics must be understood in the context of the general Indian political setup of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century. The British imagined India as comprised of a series of distinct communities: castes, tribes, and religions. The fundamental division, in their eyes, was between Muslims and Hindus. This vision, formalized, objectified, and quantified in the Census, became the basis for the reorganisation of Indian politics. Although the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a creation of the British, was never an integral part of British India, democratisation of the political organisation of the State replicated this communal frame. Ladakh became incorporated into this modern political frame, and in the process was communalised. The first formal representation of demands and grievances from Ladakh was made in November 1931 to the Glancy Commission of Enquiry, instituted after repeated communal clashes in the Kashmir Valley and extended protests against the rule of the (Hindu) Maharaja. The Glancy Commission which was organised and solicited representations on the basis of religious community, became the proximate cause of the organisation of the Buddhist elite in Ladakh. Contacts between Buddhist revivalists among Kashmiri Pundits, organised in the Kashmir Raj Bodhi Maha Sabha, and the religious elite in Ladakh had already been made as early as 1917. The Pundits embracing Buddhism viewed Ladakh as the last haven of Buddhism in India. Familiar with the scramble for numbers in the politics of India and J&K, the Pundits successfully presented Ladakh as a predominantly Buddhist area. Throughout the final report of the Glancy Commission, "Ladakh" is used synonymously with "Buddhist". As the Muslims of Ladakh did not enjoy the same kind of patronage from the outside, their case remained unrepresented. In 1934 the Young Men's Buddhist Association, later renamed as Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) was founded. Its primary aim was the protection and promotion of the interests of the Buddhists of Ladakh. No formal organisation of such a kind ever existed among the Muslims of Leh district, as the Ladakh Muslim Association (LMA) has never been much more than an ad hoc body activated in times of communal trouble. Deep divisions within the Muslim community between Shia and Sunni are an important reason for this. Already in the 1930s, then, Ladakhi participation in formal politics was based on religious community. This was the way in which the Kashmiri Assembly, the Praja Sabha, was organised. Ladakh obtained two seats for its Buddhist community, while Ladakhi Muslims -- who at the time formed somewhat less than 50% of the population -- had no representation. The point here is that it is quite irrelevant whether at this time Ladakhis saw religion as the fundamental division amongst themselves; the institutional setup and the way that Ladakh was understood by outsiders were such that there was no escaping a practice of such a differentiation. Factionalism in Ladakhi Politics In spite of this early communalisation of the political frame in Ladakh, local politics, including various agitations, was not usually communal in form or content. The main dividing line in Ladakhi politics has long been that between supporters and opponents of Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, 'head lama' of Ladakh and currently Indian ambassador to Mongolia. Bakula rose to power in 1949 when he replaced Kalon Tsewang Rigzin as District President of National Conference. Bakula was put in this position by Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah after what is sometimes referred to as the 'Coup at Choglamsar Bridge'. A group of young, modern educated Ladakhis, including Buddhists, Muslims, and a Christian, conspired to poison the ear of Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah to put an end to 'Kalonism'. The Kalon, it was alleged, was too dominant and dictatorial for the new democratic era, and should be replaced by a figure with a more popular basis for support. Of course, today many reinterpret this event, like practically everything else, along communal lines, reducing it to a Muslim conspiracy. However, the historical evidence refutes this. In any case, the politics of Ladakh ever since the 1949-coup has been characterised by rivalry between the ruling Bakula-faction and their challengers. Over the years, the opposition to the Bakulafaction has focused on two main criticisms. One is the participation of prominent religious leaders in politics. The other is the lack of education among political actors. Given the respect that religious leaders enjoy in Ladakhi society, both among Buddhists and Muslims, it is very difficult to raise objections to the decisions taken in the realm of politics by such leaders, some critics argue. The price to pay for those who nevertheless dared doing so has often been social alienation for shorter or longer periods of time, and indeed physical violence. The people who put up a counter-candidate to Bakula in Ladakh's first real elections in 1960 -- all of whom came from families that are patrons (chindaki) of Drukpa Kargyud monasteries, whereas Bakula heads the Gelugspa school -- were faced with a social boycott which lasted for about a year. Moreover, several were beaten up during the campaign, including one who later became an MP and Union Minister. Witnesses say that when he found out who was behind the attack (which took place in the Gompa Soma in Leh Bazaar), he chased that person (a monk) through the bazaar with a gun in his hand and "would have killed him if he had caught him." Later, both were in Delhi in prominent positions and they continue to play a crucial role in representing Ladakh's interests at the Centre. As for the lack of education, criticism has been aimed at the inability of leaders to take action on complex aspects of economic and social life. For example, there is the story about Bakula having declined Scheduled Tribe status for Ladakh in the 1950s, when it was offered by Nehru, because he felt it meant lowering the status of Ladakhis. There is no hard evidence for this tale, but it is often brought up to illustrate the point about Bakula's incapacity of understanding modern worldly affairs. Nonetheless, given the close links between religious leaders and the dominant political groupings locally, criticisms of lack of competence have not had much of an impact. In fact, the Bakula-faction, in spite of the Kushok's absence from Ladakh in recent years, continues to dominate the political agenda of Ladakh. Communal strategies: the 1989 agitation and after Despite the internal power struggle within the political establishment of Leh District --which has very little to do with communalism--the communal card can be and is played. This was most evident during the latest agitation for greater local autonomy 1989-93 which eventually led to the agreement on the formation of the Leh Autonomous Hill District Council. (See also Himal ... and ...) Ever since Partition, the relationship between the State Government and the Ladakh Region has been one of deep mistrust. The assumption inherent in much political thinking, especially among the Buddhists, is that since J&K is dominated by Muslims, local administration is bound to be biased in favour of Muslims. Documentation of this claim has been on the agenda ever since the first representation by the Buddhists in 1931. Over the years, this feeling of being discriminated against has been strengthened by interventions by outsiders, from Kashmiri Pundits and Sri Lankan Buddhists to western tourists and academics. Likewise, the economic development of Ladakh has meant that many young Ladakhis have received education without being able to find a job afterwards. As government statistics show, the number of unemployed in Ladakh is not increasing that much, but the level of education of unemployed is going up rapidly. The obvious thing to do was to blame the State Government which is seen as the main provider of resources, including jobs. The agitation of 1989, then, was aimed primarily at the state government. This is recognized by both Muslims and Buddhists. The problem was how to mobilize a large enough section of the population, in spite of the deep internal divisions. A conscious decision was taken to use religion, as was admitted by one of the key people behind the agitation. Obviously, this communalisation caused deep resentment among the Muslims, both in Leh and Kargil. In an interview in 1989, the late Agha Hyder, one of the most powerful leaders in the Suru Valley expressed his distress over the issue. "We are all Ladakhis. We all suffer under the Kashmiris. We should fight them together, instead of each other." Kacho Mohammed Ali Khan, a former politician of Kargil, says: "It was communalized, but really aimed at the govt of J&K. Here it had repercussions, but we kept it under control. The people here are angry about the communalization and the forced conversions that took place, for example at Sakti. Leh is taking most of the benefits. On the whole in our country, all the media took a high pitch as if something very specific was happening here. Communal parties from Jammu and India made it a bigger thing. It was communalized because without opium the masses can't stir." Using religion confirmed not only to a century-long tradition of administrative classification and practice, but also glossed over the internal differences among Buddhists and Muslims. Applying a method of carrot and stick -- and big sticks were used to great effect -- Buddhist leaders managed to mobilize a large section of the Buddhist community around the demand for greater autonomy. A social boycott of the Muslims ensued, lasting for three years beginning in 1989. This was the first time that social boycott -- a traditional Ladakhi tool in 'dispute settlement' -- was applied to an entire community. In November 1992, the boycott was lifted after pressure from the Congress(I) Government in Delhi and the Muslims agreed to work for a Hill Council. In October 1993, the Central Government, the State Government and the leaders of the Buddhists and Muslims of Leh District worked out a framework for the future council. A Solomonic deal was struck in which the State Government agreed to the word "Autonomous" being included in the name of the Council in return for the Buddhist leaders agreeing to the Council being placed within the framework of the J&K Constitution. All matters, except police and the judiciary, were to be relegated to the Council's portfolio. The remaining question is: is this formula conducive to the solution of the communal problem in Ladakh? Hill Councils and the problem of Communalism First, it should be noted that the Hill Council in itself does not immediately address the problems of power struggle in Ladakh. The long-standing tension between religious and political leaders, between educated and less educated people, between partakers in "modern" Ladakhi life and village-based life cannot be resolved by the mere introduction of yet another administrative body. But the advent of Hill Council does make it clear that from now on, all important administrative responsibilities lie firmly with the people of Leh District. All participants in the process leading to Hill Council point out that the main challenge is to curb corruption and in this respect, the communal issue is not very relevant, since everybody acknowledges that corruption in general is connected with persons, not with communities. At the same time, the agitation has created deep rifts between the communities. Many Muslim families who had to flee from their villages in '89-90 still have not been resettled. When asked whether the Hill Council has a responsibility for the rebuilding of communal harmony, Tsering Samphel, ex-MLA and presently District President of Congress (I), said: Our ethnic identity is Buddhist, but also Ladakhi. The problem is the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism. Baltis (often used as coterminous with Shia) and Ladakhis have much in common, but when religion comes in, they forget this link. If we (Leh and Kargil) were together, we'd have a much greater impact." This sense of a greater Ladakhi shared identity, is also emphasized by Kacho Mohammed Ali Khan: "We have the same culture, same tongue, same stock. Divisions are due to religious fanaticism. I think religious fanaticism is not a good thing, in whichever religion or community it occurs. The main cause is Partition, then the turn was taken." However, among the youth of both communities, there is little evidence of an awareness of this 'Ladakhiness" that unites Buddhists and Muslims. The Ladakh Buddhist Association has had problems controlling their Youth Wing. In particular the gangs of radical youths that were used to enforce the boycott and other agitational activities are today posing a serious threat to stability and healing of community relations. Especially the upcoming generation, who 'came of age', so to speak, during the agitation, blame Muslims for every ill that befalls them. It will remain to be seen whether they can be controlled. The continuing series of blasts in Leh, which the LBA denies it has anything to do with, is not causing any material or personal damage. But it certainly does nothing to help restore a climate of confidence among the communities. The Hill Council is seen by the politicians as a challenge and an opportunity, even though they are aware of the dangers that come with it. "The Hill Council is required desperately. How else can one run such a vast area? But games can be played by the J&K government even more than before. They will have 36 people to pull strings with...", says Pinto Norbu, the ex-MLC and minister who recently rejoined the National Conference. There is a very deep-seated mistrust of the J&K government. Decades of alleged misrule have caused both communities to doubt whether this will come to an end. Even if the Hill Council is granted by the Centre soon, it will still have to be ratified if and when an elected government will take power in J&K. There is little that could stop such a government from reversing the Hill Council decision. As for the structure of Hill Council, it contains measures for the protection and representation of minorities, i.e. the Muslims. It also envisages the break-up of Leh District into more than 20 constituencies. This 'constituentification' of the district does allow for a new, or perhaps older kind of communalism along regional lines, as the differences within the district are greater than the recent agitation might suggest. The nomadic herdsman in Changthang might just realize that he does not have terribly much in common with the hotel owner in Leh or the peasant of Sham. In the words of Mohd. Akbar Ladakhi, the former president of the LMA: "Unless responsibility is given to honest people, Hill Council will be a big failure and can create more divisions, for example between Changpa, Shamma, Nubrapa, and so on. Hill Council is more of a test than an achievement. Even today the contestation of elections is not settled, because one cannot use religion. We must use regional or existing parties. Regionalisation is strong, but many are aware that this can't solve our problems." The challenge to the political elite in Leh is obviously to create a political platform which can gain support on the district level. So far, only the local Congress(I)-branch seems to have taken up this challenge. The absence of open, public political debate in Leh District is another factor which may make it difficult for local politicians to part from the old ways of pursuing politics. Currently, there is a wait-and-see attitude among the agitation leaders. So far, none of the LBA and LMA leaders have openly joined any political party, but there is a lot of jockeying for position going on behind the scenes. There is much speculation about who will join which party. Congress leaders have announced that they will make a strong effort to make the council a Congress council. During the agitation, there were frequent contacts between LBA leaders and the BJP. However, it is thought that the BJP will not gain much of a foothold in Ladakh, given its overt communal politics. It appears that Ladakhis from all communities, including the Christians who were the target of an agitation in 1988, want to rid the region of communal politics. Whether they will succeed simply though the Hill council formula is questionable. Asked whether the Hill Council can play a role in de-communalising Ladakhi politics, Tsering Samphel says: "Yes, that is our duty. But we are part of a system, an undeclared law, that everything is decided along communal lines." The problem is indeed that the Indian polity has been based on communalisation right from the time before Independence. This communal frame, which permeates everything from Mandal to the Census, remains firmly in place. And as part of the system, Ladakhis, whether they like it or not, may have to play the political game along communal lines, both within Ladakh and in their representations to the outside. The logic of communalism is not resolved by the Hill Council formula, not in Ladakh, nor anywhere else. In fact, the Hill Council formula is a 'natural' development of the communal frame, based as it is on the institutionalisation of difference of community, culture, religion, obscuring and indeed ignoring divisions within and across these communities, cultures, religions. Devolution and decentralisation of decision making power is desperately needed in many parts of the subcontinent. The Hill Council formula is an improvement over the centralised rule from the State and National capitals, where there is little sympathy and less understanding for marginal areas and populations. But to think that here lies the key to resolving the problem of communalism would be a mistake. It will be up to those in charge of the councils to create such solutions. They are not already included in the deal. Martijn van Beek is completing a PhD in Development Sociology at Cornell University. His research is supported by a Peace Scholar Award from the United States Institute of Peace. Kristoffer Brix Bertelsen is finishing a PhD in Social Anthropology at Aarhus University. They are also working on a book on modern Ladakhi politics. Opinions are those of the authors. >>BOX 1: 550 words WAITING FOR RAO Martijn van Beek Somewhere in Narasimha Rao's office there is a pile of papers. Somewhere in that pile is a bill, approved by the State Government, the Governor, the Home Ministry, and the Kashmir Affairs Office. The bill, declaring Leh District's Autonomous Hill Council, has -- one imagines -- a dotted line somewhere near the bottom. That dotted line awaits the signature of the PM. It has been lying on his desk for months now, and it could remain there forever, it seems. When we conceived the article in October last year, there was great optimism among the political leadership in Leh that Hill council was around the corner. It would take a few weeks, perhaps only days, until the Bill would go to the President. At the end of January, we met in Delhi with some of the key players, P. Namgial, Akbar Ladakhi, and Rigzin Jora. The change in mood was dramatic. There was a strong feeling of disillusionment, as these excerpts from an interview with Rigzin Jora illustrate. "We have been quite unfortunate. Every time we feel things are picking up, something happens that derails it. It seems jinxed. Last September/October we were quite optimistic. P. Namgial told us that it was going to the cabinet, so we were all excited. Then we realized that the entire ministry was taken to the PM's office, so it had to go through the whole process again." "The Home Minister and all the people who matter have given assurances before. This has not been going on just since last year, but for five years now. At one point, even the government seemed to be in haste, when the issue was being raised in parliament. But now, I think they are trying to push the election in J&K. We mentioned in the memo that the much talked-about political process in J&K can be initiated from Ladakh. You grant the Hill Council and hold elections to it. And the misguided youth of Kashmir could also be encouraged to accept a system on the basis of the Hill council. We wrote it in our memo, but no one bothers." "This PM only does things on his own convenience, never mind what. He has his own speed. The PM seems to think about the Kashmir issue as a whole. When we met the minister, we said Kashmir belongs to people who raise secessionist slogans and they have been attended to. And Ladakhis -- nothing! The problem is, when you go to the PM's office, he hardly gives you two or three minutes. The Governor has been very keen on giving it. There has been no let-up from his side. That is the problem. If we go to the ministers, the governor, they will say that they have done their share, that it is up to the PM now." "By March we should come up with some concrete action plan. It will take quite some time before we can prepare the people for another agitation. We can't -- unlike in the past -- just snap our fingers. We may begin with a pen-down strike for a week or ten days, and then take another step." "In India nothing seems to move. I guess we'll have to get in touch with the ISI now. Go to Kathmandu to the Pakistan Embassy. [laughs]." >>BOX 2: (or put it in the 'briefs' section, or wherever) 630 words "A New Idea of Buddhism" Martijn van Beek The Ladakh Buddhist Association has been branching out into new activities, extending the scope of its fight against social evils. Recently, in the days before Ladakhi New Year on January 2, the Ladakh Ecological Development Group called a meeting of representatives of the LBA, local administration, village headmen, and police and power department. The topic of discussion was the problem of illegal consumption of electricity in Leh. The diesel generator that supplies power to the entire valley has a very limited capacity. In summer, it is supplemented by that wonder of engineering, the Stakna Hydel Project. In summer, it silts up; in winter, it freezes. So most of the time the full burden falls on the generator. Leh gets very cold in winter. Fuel for heating, be it wood, coal, or kerosene, is expensive. Electricity is free, or so it was treated by the urban population. Electric heaters have gained much popularity, but with their high power consumption, they constitute a major drain on the electricity supply. Now, formally, one is not allowed to use electricity for more than a few lightbulbs and the odd TV or VCR. But not surprisingly, most who can afford them use electric heaters. As a result, power supply needs to be rationed, so that some areas have power on some days, and others on others. LEDeG figured, correctly, that if there were no illegal heaters, everyone would have power every day, and at a higher voltage, too. All agreed. The LBA volunteered to go around to 'educate' the people. The next day, the eager volunteers of the Youth Wing gathered at Gompa Soma. Unfortunately, the police and electricity department, who were supposed to provide the necessary legal back-up -- didn't show up. But, as Tsering Dorje put it, it was impossible to control the volunteers, who went out to do the job anyway. And they did a thorough job, indeed. They raided people's houses, irrespective of class, caste, or community, entering without asking, searching rooms, under beds, in cupboards, and collecting whatever illegal electrical equipment they could find. They operated in small groups, some carrying sticks, and explained the purpose of their raid as: "This is a new idea of Buddhism." At least that's what they told us when they took away a heater -- which we weren't using and didn't belong to us -- from the 'office' downtown. We were even asked to sign a 'receipt', which they took with them... The next day, together with many other dispossessed Ladakhis from all walks of life, we went to Gompa Soma to find out what was going to happen to the goods. It was cheerfully explained that the 1400-odd heaters (averaging 1500-2000 Watts) would be smashed on the main street, as soon as the trouble with the police was straightened out. It turned out that in their enthusiasm, some volunteers had beaten up a high-ranking police officer. The District Commissioner had been threatened to, although he had parted with his heater without resistance. In the afternoon, the offending objects were publicly smashed, as promised. Many onlookers wore a sad face, and more than a few expressed their disagreement. In fact, the people from the Telecommunications compound -- most of whom are from the plains and have a hard time adjusting to Ladakh's winter temperatures, which at the time hovered around -30C -- went on strike for a day. While the LBA people were aware of the rather shaky legal basis for their campaign, the expected result was achieved: bright lights in every home, every day. But one hopes that the methodology is not foreboding of things to come, if and when Hill Council comes. And whether the Buddha ever said anything about heaters, one wonders...